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A critical part of forming a long-term partnership, be it marriage,
employment, co-authorship or some other commitment, is having to
trade o¤ among the various traits of one’s potential partners. The
nature of this trade-o¤ depends both on the type of commitment being
considered, as well as on the person making the commitment.
In this paper I focus on the impact that this trade-o¤ has on the
marriage market equilibrium. Agents di¤er from one another along
more than one trait, and preferences over traits is not homogenous.
This implies that all agents do not agree completely on the desirability
of potential partners. I characterize both the core allocation as well
as the equilibrium that results when there are costly search frictions.
The main …nding is that in the presence of frictions, an individual
who is moderately appealing to diverse tastes among the opposite sex
may make a better match than someone who is found to be stunning by
one group, but leaves the others cold. Assortative matching patterns
emerge along more than one dimension, with the result that there is
positive correlation along more than one trait in matched individuals.
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11 Introduction
A critical part of forming a long-term partnership, be it marriage, employ-
ment, co-authorship or some other commitment, is having to trade o¤ among
the various traits of one’s potential partners. Any person is a bundle of char-
acteristics, and forming binding ties implies accepting the entire bundle; one
cannot pick and choose among the characteristics. The nature of the trade-
o¤ depends both on the type of commitment being considered, as well as on
the person making the commitment.
In the labor market context, clearly, …rms in di¤erent sectors value worker
skills di¤erently. When it comes to marriage, some of us are attracted
by intelligence, others by wealth or power, and yet others …nd a sense of
humor absolutely necessary. Are these di¤erences in preferences completely
random? There is evidence that this is not so. Vandenberg (1972) talks
about systematic di¤erences in the relative weights that individuals give to
various personality factors and physical attractiveness in potential mates.
He quotes studies that indicate that choices of dates and eventually of mates
may be governed by a di¤erent combination of values for various individuals.
The existing literature on marriage does not address this issue. The usual
assumption made is that all men agree upon the ranking of women as mar-
riage partners, and all women have identical preferences over men as mates.
Becker(1973) speci…es the production function for households (matched cou-
ples), and uses the properties of this function to describe preferences over
mates and outcomes in the marriage market. All households have the same
production function, with the result that agents have homogenous prefer-
ences. Under certain assumptions perfect assortative mating results, with
the most desirable man matching with the most desirable woman, and so on
down the line.
Becker’s model has been extended to an environment that involves search,
when one meets potential partners sequentially and utility in the future is not
as valuable as utility today (see Burdett-Coles(1997), Shimer-Smith(2000),
Eeckhout(2000), Bloch-Ryder(2000)). Once again, agents are assumed to
be in perfect agreement on the ranking of potential partners. When utility
is non-transferable, the steady state equilibrium partitions the two sides into
classes according to their desirability. Women who belong to any particular
class propose only to men in the same class or higher, men do the same.
In equilibrium only men and women from the same class marry. Expected
utility from a potential match is nondecreasing in attractiveness. The more
2attractive a woman is, the more likely she is to match with a highly desirable
man. Matching is positive assortative even in the presence of search frictions.
(Stronger assumptions than Becker’s are required, see Shimer-Smith(2000)).
None of these models deal with heterogenous preferences1.
I attempt to capture the impact of systematic di¤erences in the relative
weights that individuals give to various personality factors in a very simple
framework. I allow agents on one side of the market to have heterogenous
preferences overpotential matesand model twodi¤erent scenarios; in the …rst
both men and women care only about a single trait in the opposite sex, but
the men are split into two groups with diametrically opposed preferences.
For instance, one group of men might prefer tall women, while the other
prefers short; one group might prefer dark skinned women while the other
prefers light skinned; one group might like blue eyes, while the other prefers
dark grey.
In the second scenario, I allow women to di¤er continuously along two
dimensions (or traits) and men along one. Once again men are divided into
two groups by their preferences, one group of men cares more about trait 1
than about trait 2, while the second group is more concerned about trait 2
than about 1. The two groups of men therefore rank women di¤erently as
potential partners. In both scenarios women have homogenous preferences,
they rank men identically.
Admittedly these are special cases, but they have the advantage of pro-
viding a tractable framework and capture the essence of the trading decision.
The results remain robust when the assumptions on preferences are relaxed
in certain directions.
Singles of opposite sexes meet randomly. Upon meeting, each individual
is perfectly informed about all the characteristics of the other individual
and decides whether to propose or not. If both propose then the match is
consummated. For simplicity, it is assumed that these two individuals exit
the marriage market forever immediately after consummation of the match,
and are replaced by two single individuals with identical characteristics (the
couple has two children with the boy looking exactly like his father and the
girl her mother.) This assumption ensures that the distribution of singles
remains stationary through time. All agents discount the future, and prefer
1Burdett-Wright(1998) go to the other extreme, and assume that preferences are com-
pletely random. This would predict that on average every man and woman would receive
the same number of proposals, something that we do not observe in reality.
3to be matched, to remaining single. Utility is non-transferable.
The steady state equilibrium in this model also partitions the two sides
according to their desirability. Since all men are ranked identically, more
desirable men have a higher expected utility. The same cannot be said
about women when men have diametrically opposed preferences, as assumed
in the …rst scenario. For example, suppose women vary in their height and
suppose that one group of men prefers to match with tall women while the
other group prefers short women. Then in the presence of a lot of frictions,
it is so di¢cult to meet potential partners that agents are not too choosy.
Women of medium height become acceptable to both groups of men and get
proposals more frequently than do very tall or very short women. As a
result, their expected utility is greater than that of either the tallest or the
shortest woman. As frictions go down, and it becomes easier to meet people,
tall and short women start doing better than those of medium height.
Heterogenous preferences thus impacts the relative performance of women
in a signi…cant way. Those women that have the best chances of matching
when there are a lot of frictions, become the very women who do worst as
frictions become very small.
In the second case when women vary along more than one trait (say height
and wealth), and when one group of men cares about trait 1 (prefer tall
women) and the second group cares about trait 2 (prefer wealthier women),
expected utility of women is non-decreasing in both traits. That is, if a
woman is taller and wealthier than another, her expected utility will be at
least as high as that of the other. However, the model predicts that a very
tall woman could do worse than a woman of medium height with slightly
more wealth, in the presence of a lot of frictions. In this sense, mediocrity
in both traits sometimes wins over quality in one.
Another interesting feature of the steady state equilibrium is that self-
selection sometimes emerges. Although women care only about the en-
dowment of their partner, and not about their preferences, there sometimes
exist certain classes of tall women who match only with men who prefer
tall women, and classes of wealthy women who match only with men who
appreciate wealth.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the framework; Sec-
tion 3 describes the steady state equilibrium in the presence of costly search
when men have diametrically opposed preferences; Section 4 characterizes
steady state allocation in the presence of frictions when women vary contin-
uously along two traits, and men have heterogenous preferences over these
4dimensions; Section 5 extends the analysis in Section 4 to describe the core
allocation in the static assignment game; and Section 6 summarizes and dis-
cusses possible extensions. The appendix contains certain proofs.
2 Framework
There are two sides in the matching game, men and women. Women are
characterized by two traits, any two from a number of traits such as height,
color of eyes, color of hair, beauty, intelligence, wealth, sense of humor, etc.,
etc..., that matter in the matching game. In the rest of this section I will let
trait 1 be the height of the woman and trait 2 be the wealth (endowment)
of the woman.2
Let W = [0;1] £ (0;1] be the set of all women3. Any particular woman
w is represented by the pair (x1
w;x2
w), where x1
w 2 [0;1] is her height, and
x2
w 2 (0;1] her endowment of wealth. The closer x1
w is to 1; the taller is the
woman, and the closer x2
































Let M = [0;1]£(0;1] be the set of men. Any particular man m is char-
acterized by the pair (xm;i); where xm represents the man’s distinguishing
2I pick speci…c traits simply for ease of exposition, and this is not to be interpreted as
a statement of values.
3The reason why W is not the closed set [0;1]
2 will become clear in the section on the
core of the assignment game. It is a technical assumption necessary in that section.
5trait in the matching game and i represents his preference over the traits of
women. For ease of exposition I assume that xm stands for his wealth. As
among women, the closer xm is to 1; the more wealthy the man.
All women prefer wealthy men. Men exhibit heterogeneity in their pref-
erences over women. Let M1 = fm : i 2 (0;µ]g and M2 = fm : i 2 (µ;1]g
represent two di¤erent sets of men. All the men in M1 have identical pref-
erences over potential partners, and all the men in M2 also agree upon how
they would rank women as potential partners4. The preferences of the two
groups are di¤erent, however. I illustrate two such di¤erences in Section 3
and 4 of this paper.
In Section 3, I assume that height is the only trait that matters to all men
and they are indi¤erent to the woman’s wealth. Men belonging to M1 prefer
tall women, while men in M2 prefer short women. This section examines
the nature of equilibrium when the two groups of men have diametrically
opposite preferences over the same trait.
In Section 4, I assume that men in M1 still continue to care only about
the height of the woman, and the taller she is the better. Men in M2
however prefer wealthy women and are indi¤erent to her height. This section
examines what equilibrium looks like when di¤erent groups of men do not
value diverse traits in a woman identically. An implicit assumption in both
sections isthat the preferencesof men are independent of theirlevel of wealth.
Instantaneous utility in any period to an individual who remains single
is 0: Upon matching, both the agents in the match obtain a strictly positive
instantaneous utility that depends on their partner’s traits, after which they
immediately exit the market and are replaced by clones, one single woman
and one single man, with exactly the same traits as the pair that left5. As
a result, the distribution of traits among singles is stationary. Since staying
single implies a utility of 0; all individuals strictly prefer to match at some
point in time, to staying single forever.
One can see that the search models which assume that both men and
women agree perfectly upon the ranking of potential mates is a special case
4The two groups do not have to be of equal sizes. In Figure 2 you can see that the
measure of men in set M1 = µ; while the measure of men in set M2 = 1 ¡ µ; with µ > 1
2:
5One may be tempted to change the story told here to one where after matching and
obtaining the instantaneous utility, the pair splits up and goes back into the market as
singles. The problem which that story is that any man (or woman) would then match
with every person of the opposite sex that they happen to meet, obtain the instantaneous
utility, and then go back to searching.
6of the above set-up, with all men belonging to either the set M1 or set M2
(that is, all men have identical preferences).
Singles of opposite sexes meet according to a random matching function.
For any individual the arrival rate of singles of the opposite sex is ®; where
® is the parameter of a Poisson process6. All agents discount the future at
rate r:
Let the cumulative distribution of wealth among men in any period t
be Gm (:): Let the marginal cumulative distribution of wealth and height
among women be G1
w (:) and G2
w (:); respectively. The cloning assumption
made above ensures that none of these distributions depend upon t:
The individual decision problem in any period is whether to propose upon
meeting someone of the opposite sex. This decision will depend upon the
individual’s prospects of marriage in the coming periods. Suppose proposals,
which depend both upon the exogenously speci…ed arrival rate and on the
strategies of members of the opposite sex, are infrequent. Then the best
response for the individual facing these prospects is not to be too choosy.
I consider an equilibrium in stationary strategies. In this environment
a stationary strategy for any single man is to delineate a subset of W, and
to propose to any woman belonging to this set upon meeting, and reject all
other women: Similarly, a stationary strategy for a single woman would be
to propose to any man belonging to a particular subset of M upon meeting,
and reject all other men. We assume that there is no cost to proposing, so
an individual would propose to any potential mate they desire even if they
knew that the other would turn the proposal down.
A stationary steady state equilibrium is de…ned as follows: given Gm (:);
G1
w (:) and G2
w (:); each individual agent chooses that stationary strategy that
maximizes his/her utility, taking as given the strategies used by all others.
3 Diametrically opposed preferences
In this section the only trait of women that matters to men is their height.
We can collapse the joint distribution of height and wealth in women into
the marginal distribution of height, since men only take this into account to
determine their strategies.
6The arrival rate does not depend upon the characteristics of the individual, it is the
same for everyone.
7It is possible now to represent women along a single line. We can do
the same for men by taking the marginal distribution of their wealth, with
the result that both sides of the market can be conveniently represented as
in Figure 3. At any level of wealth, the proportion of men that prefer tall











The instantaneous utility that a man in set M1 receives upon matching
with a woman w is 1 + x1
w; and the instantaneous utility that a man in set
M2 receives is 2¡x1
w:7 We can see that [1;2] is the range of utility that a man
can get in any match. It is also obvious that men belonging to M1 prefer tall
women (the greater x1
w is, the greater their utility from the match), while
men belonging to M2 prefer short women (the smaller x1
w is, the better o¤
they are in the match). Any woman who matches with the man m receives
instantaneous utility 1 + xm: This re‡ects her preference for wealthy men,
and [1;2] is the range of instantaneous utility that a woman receives from
any match:
Let us now consider the decision problem that a single woman w faces at a
particular point in time. Let U! (w) denote the expected discounted lifetime
7To obtain a …nite number of classes in equilibrium it is necessary that the utility from
being matched is strictly greater than 0; so the 1 + x and 2 ¡ x. Any pair of utility
functions of the nature c + x and 1 +c ¡x, where c is a strictly positive constant, would
do the job.
8utility of this woman at the end of any period, Gm (:nw) the cumulative
distribution of wealth among single men who propose to w upon meeting,
and ®! (w) the arrival rate of proposals to the woman w. Both Gm (:nw) and
®! (w) are well de…ned given the strategies of other agents. Then U! (w)




((1 ¡®! (w))U! (w) + ®! (w)E max[1 + xm;U! (w)])
where the expectation is taken over dGm (:nw): A woman who is single
this period could meet a man who proposes to her with probability ®! (w)
next period, and she would accept him if she gets more from the match than
she does by remaining single in the marriage market. The woman’s optimal
strategy is to accept any man as long as his wealth xm ¸ U! (w)¡1: Letting
the reservation wealth level that this woman accepts in a potential partner






(xm ¡ R! (w))dGm (:nw) ¡1: (1)
Similarly, the optimal strategy for any man m 2 M1 is to accept all
women taller than his reservation height level of R1
¹ (m); and reject all the
others, where R1


















w (:nm) ¡ 1; (2)
The optimal strategy of m 2 M2, on the other hand, is to accept all
women shorter than his reservation height level of R2
¹ (m); and reject all
others, where R2
¹ (m) is given by
R
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dx ¡ 1 (5)
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3.1 Structure of Equilibrium Allocation.
In equilibrium, there exist two partitions on [0;1] that delineate men into
classes along the wealth dimension. Similarly there exist two other parti-
tions on [0;1] that divide women into di¤erent segments along the height
dimension. Let ¹1 = [¹1(n1);:::::;¹1(0)] and ¹2 = [¹2(n2);:::::;¹2(0)] with
¹1(0) = ¹2(0) = 1; be the two partitions on men’s wealth: The elements
of these partitions correspond to the reservation wealth levels of women in
equilibrium.
Classes are formed as follows:
² There are n1 + n2 ¡ 1 classes of men.
² Men in set M1 with xm 2 [¹1(1);¹1(0)] belong to the …rst M1 class of
men.
² Men in set M2 with xm 2 [¹2(1);¹2(0)] belong to the …rst M2 class of
men.
² Fork 2 f2;::::;n1g; men in set M1 with xm 2 [¹1(k);¹1(k ¡ 1)) belong
to the kth M1 class of men.
² For k 2 f0;::::;n2g men in set M2 with xm 2 [¹2(k);¹2(k ¡ 1)] belong
to the kth M2 class of men.8
8Notice that the …rst classes of men are delineated by closed intervals, while the other
classes are half open intervals.
10² There is a positive measure of men in every class.
All men belonging to the same class have the same reservation height.
Let !1(k) be the reservation height of any man in the kth M1 class, and
!2(k) be the reservation height of any man in the kth M2 class. Remember
that men in set M2 propose to all women whose height is greater than their
reservation height, and men in set M1 propose to all women whose height is
lesser than their reservation height.
In a steady state equilibrium the reservation heights of men in set M1 is
nondecreasing in their wealth, and the reservation heights of men in set M2
is nonincreasing in their wealth The intuition for this is very simple. Take
two men m and m
0 belonging to set M1; with x0
m
0 > xm: Then any woman
who is willing to propose to m will also propose to m
0. This implies that m
0
will receive at least as many proposals as m and so cannot have a reservation
strategy that is less than that of m
0: The same logic works for men in set
M2
Thereforewe have !1(1) ¸ !1(2) ¸ ::: ¸ !1(n1); and !2(n2) ¸ :::!2(2) ¸
!2(1): Let !1(0) = 1 and !2(0) = 0: Then !1 = [!1(n1);:::::;!1(0)] and
!2 = [!2(0);:::::;!2(n2)] are the two partitions on the height dimension of
women. All women belonging to the same class also have the same reser-
vation wealth, and as stated before, these reservation wealth levels form the
partitions ¹1 and ¹2 in equilibrium. But de…ning the class boundaries for
women is a little tricky.
3.2 Construction of the equilibrium
For simplicity of exposition I will construct the steady state equilibrium after
making a few simplifying assumptions. I also compare what the steady state
looks like as frictions get smaller and smaller.
I begin by assuming that
² the height of women is distributed uniformly on [0;1]; so G1
w (x) = x
for x 2 [0;1];
² thewealth of men isalsodistributed uniformly on [0;1]; makingGm (x) =
x for x 2 [0;1];








11Let m be one of the wealthiest men in set M1: All women propose to
him, and so the arrival rate of proposals that he faces is ®; and G1
w (:nm) =
G1
w (:): He belongs to the 1st M1 class and so his reservation utility is !1(1):











dx ¡ 1: (7)
Doing the same for one of the wealthiest men in set M2, and using equation
6 we get
!










Straightforward inspection tells us that for all
®
r < 1; !1(1) < 1; !2(1) >
0:
Now we could either have (1) !1(1) > !2(1) (2) !1(1) = !2(1) or (3)
!1(1) < !2(1): The relative performance of women is dramatically di¤erent
in each of these cases, as the following …gures show.
Figure 3A portrays equilibrium when
®
r is small (there are a lot of fric-
tions). The boxes in the …gure indicate the matches that could form in
equilibrium. No match will form in any region that is outside all the boxes.
The shaded regions are the ones where women match with men in both sets
M1 and M2: The boxes that are lettered are the regions where women match
exclusively with men in set M1 or in set M2.
In this case the frictions are large enough for us to have !1(1) < !2(1):
What does this mean for the relative performance of women? Consider any
woman with x1
w 2 [!1(1);!2(1)]: The wealthiest man in M1 is willing to
propose to her, and so all men in M1 will propose to her. The wealthiest
men in M2 is also willing to propose to her, and so all men in M2 propose
to her. Every woman in this class gets proposals from all men, and so
have the highest expected payo¤ possible. In other words, women with
x1
w 2 [!1(1);!2(1)] form the …rst class of women. I will call this class
of women both the …rst M1 class as well as the …rst M2 class, and their
reservation wealth is ¹1(1) = ¹2(1). The reason why I do this is because
men in the …rst M1 class propose to women in the …rst M1 class, and vice
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Asshown here it ispossiblethat neitherthetallest northe shortestwoman
belongs to the …rst class of women. Outside this class, taller women do better
than shorter ones. This is because there is a larger measure of men who
prefer tall women. In this model, when the measure of men in set M1 gets
larger, and size of set M2 gets smaller, taller women do better on average than
shorter women (simply because they get more proposals). There is no direct
impact on the expected payo¤ of men, µ does not enter their reservation
height function (as you will see later). There is an indirect e¤ect from the
fact that tall women get choosier, what I call the insider-outsider e¤ect. The
size of the 1st M1 class is decreasing in µ: There is no change in the expected
payo¤ of men who continue to stay inside the 1st class, these are the insiders.
But those that fall from the 1st M1 class to the 2nd M1 class have a strictly
worse payo¤.
13Gale and Sotomayor (1990) de…ne stable matches in a static framework
with a …nite number of men and women. They …nd that the entry of an
additional man leaves the existing men no better o¤ (and in some cases
strictly worse o¤). The above result seems to have the same ‡avor.
Women with x1
w 2 [!2(1);!2(2)] form the 2nd M1 class of women (The
lower the M1 class that the women belongs to, the shorter she is) . Women
with x1
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As frictions grow smaller, the tallest and shortest women start doing
better. Figure 3B shows the case when !1(1) = !2(1): The 1st M1 and
the 1st M2 classes contain women of a single height, x1
w = !1(1) = !2(1),
in this case: Take men that belong to the 2nd M1 class (the men with
xm 2 [!1(2);!1(1)): Women in the …rst M1 class do not propose to them,
but they are of measure 0: Men in the 2nd M1 class therefore have the same
14reservation utility as the men in the 1st M1 class, and equilibrium partitions
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Figure 3C illustrates equilibrium when
®
r increases some more. Suddenly
we see that the tallest and shortest women are doing a lot better than the
women of medium height. Still, at some point, the reservation height of
men in set M1 and those of men in set M2 overlap (that is for some i and
j; !2(j + 1) ¸ !1(i + 1) for the …rst time). Once this happens, the women
in the middle do better than those slightly taller or slightly shorter than
themselves. As can be seen, in Figure 3C, the reservation wealth level
of women is decreases over [!2(0);!2(2)]; increases over (!2(2);!1(3));
decreases over [!1 (3);!1(2)] and increases over [!1(2);!1(0)]: So very
tall and very short women perform relatively better than other women, but
15women in the middle still have some advantage because they appeal to diverse
tastes.
0
M2 M2 M2 M2 
M2 M2 M2 M2 






1 M1 M1 M1 
M1 M1 M1 
M1 M1 M1 














M1 M1 M1 
M1 M1 M1 






M1 M1 M1 
M1 M1 M1 
M1 M1 M1 






M1 M1 M1 
M1 M1 M1 
M1 M1 M1 
M1 M1 M1 
M1 M1 M1 
M1 M1 M1 
M1 M1 M1 
M1 M1 M1 





M2 M2 M2 M2 
M2 M2 M2 M2 
M2 M2 M2 M2 

















M2 M2 M2 M2 
M2 M2 M2 M2 
M2 M2 M2 M2 







M2 M2 M2 M2 
M2 M2 M2 M2 
M2 M2 M2 M2 
M2 M2 M2 
M2 M2 M2 


















































r goes on increasing, we can see that the women in the middle continue
losing the advantage of appealing to diverse tastes. As
®
r goes to in…nity,
we see assortative mating. The wealthiest man in set M1 matches with the
tallest woman, and the wealthiest man in set M2 matches with the shortest
woman, and so on down the line. The woman of medium height does the
worst. Some men remain unmatched (For di¤erent parameter values, and
distribution of traits, it could be some women who remain single).
Clearly the greater the extent of the market (the smaller the frictions,
or the more e¢cient the matching mechanism) the greater the returns to
16someone who is very appealing to a niche, and the lower the returns to

















Figure 3F illustrates the core of the static game. The core is de…ned as a
one-to-one and onto assignment of men to women such that it is individually
rational, and no coalition can separate away and secure greater utility (than
they obtain in the core) for each of its members.
What is the e¤ect of heterogenous preferences on the payo¤ of agents in
the core? If all the men belonged to set M1; then the core allocation would
be one that matched every man to a woman whose height is equal to his
wealth (the allocation would be along the 45 degree line). One can see that
in the heterogenous case, the payo¤ to men in the core is greater than their
level of wealth (in some cases strictly so), while the payo¤ to women who
match with men in M1 is less than their height (sometimes strictly), and to
women who match with men in M2 it is greater than their height.
As you can see from …gures 3E and 3F, the steady state stationary equi-
librium of the dynamic game does not approach the core of the static game
when frictions disappear. Some men remain single in the equilibrium of the
dynamic game, while this is not true in the core. The main reason for this is
the cloning assumption. In the dynamic game, if a positive measure of very
wealthy men …nd matches and depart that does not reduce the measure of
very wealthy single men. Women can therefore a¤ord to remain choosy.
This is not so in the core of the static game. In that case, there is no
entry or exit of singles. Since every man and woman strictly prefers to be
matched to somebody rather than be single, and since the measure of men
and women is the same, nobody is single in the core allocation.
17We have looked athowfrictionsimpact therelativeperformanceof women.
What about the absolute performance? Do all women have a higherexpected



























Figure 4 allows us to compare the change in the absolute payo¤s to women
as frictions become smaller. As can be seen almost every woman does better
as
®
r goes from 5 to 500:
What is the e¤ect on men when frictions go to zero? Once again, there is
the insider-outsider e¤ect. Men who are insiders, that is those that continue
to …nd matches as friction become smaller are bettero¤, theirexpected utility
goes up on average. At the same time, women are getting choosier, which
doesn’t portend well for the outsiders. So some men who are not so wealthy
18may be able to match with a woman in the presence of a lot of frictions, but




w), a steady state equilibrium exists and is unique. It is charac-
terized by four partitions, ¹1;¹2;!1;!2 on [0;1]; with ¹1 and ¹2 partitioning
men on the basis of their wealth and !1 and !2 partitioning women on the
basis of their height.
Proof : We will prove Proposition 1 by construction. I continue to main-
tain that Gm (x) = x (wealth is uniformly distributed) and that G1
w (x) = x
(height is uniformly distributed). The proofs do not need the uniform dis-
tribution assumption in any way, but it makes notation simpler.
² let !1(0) = !2(0) = 1; ¹1(0) = 1 and ¹2(0) = 0:
² let n1 be the smallest integer such that either 0 ¸ ¹1(n1) or 0 ¸
!1(n1):
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Equations 7 and 8 give us !1(1) and !2(1): If n1 6= 1; and if !1(1) >
!2(1); let w1 be a woman with height !1(1) and let w2 be a woman with
19height !2(1): Denote R! (w1) as ¹1(1) and R! (w2) as ¹2(1): If ¹1(1) >
¹2(1) then
Claim 1: In equilibrium, men in set M1 with xm 2 [¹1(1);1] marry only
women with x1
w 2 [!1(1);1]; and vice versa. This set of men and women
form an exclusive class and match only with members of the opposite sex as
shown in …gure 4A, above.








(1 ¡ x)dx ¡ 1 (9)
Proof of Claim 1: See Appendix.
The reservation values of women in what I call the …rst M1 class cor-
responds to !1(1); and those of the men in this class is ¹1(1): Further
elements of partitions !1 and ¹1 will be determined in an identical fashion.
We now start building partitions !2 and ¹2:
Consider a man m3 in set M1with xm such that ¹2 (1) < xm < ¹1(1):
Let !1(2) be the shortest woman that he is willing to propose to (that is,
!1(2) is his reservation utility). If we have !1(2) > !2(1); then let w3 be
a woman with height !1(2);and let ¹1(2) be her reservation utility. Again
if we have ¹2(1) > ¹1(2) then.
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20Claim 2: In equilibrium, men in set M2 with xm 2 [¹2(1);1] marry only
women with x1
w 2 [0;!2(1)]; and vice versa. This set of men and women
form another exclusive class whose members match only with each other, as








(1 ¡ x)dx ¡ 1
Proof of Claim 2: See Appendix.
Notice that the reservation values of women in what I call the …rst M2
class corresponds to ¹2(1); and those of the men in this class is !2(1): Now
we proceed with determining the other elements of the partition.
Claim 3: Let i 2 f0;::::;n1g and j 2 f0;::::;n2g be the smallest integers
such that !2(j + 1) ¸ !1(i + 1) 9: Then we obtain the partitions as follows:










1(k1 ¡1) ¡ x
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2(k2 ¡ 1) ¡x
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dx ¡ 1 (11)









1(k3 ¡ 1) ¡ x
¢
dx ¡ 1; (12)
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In equilibrium, for all k such that i ¸ k men in set M1 with xm 2
[¹1(k);¹1(k ¡ 1)] marry only women with x1
w 2 [!1(k);!1(k ¡ 1)]; and
9Therefore !1 (k1) > !2 (k2) for all k1 such that i ¸ k1 and k2 such that j ¸ k2; and
!2 (k4) ¸ !1 (k3) for all k3 > i and k4 > j:
21vice versa, and for all k such that j ¸ k; men in set M2 with xm 2
[¹2(k);¹2(k ¡ 1)] marry only women with x1
w 2 [!2(k ¡1);!2(k)]; and
vice versa,
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Proof of Claim 3: See Appendix.
From this claim it is evident that all women in classes k ¸ i (tall women)
and l such that j ¸ l (short women) are women whose height works to their
advantage. They have higher reservation values (and hence higher expected
payo¤s) than women in classes h; i > h > j: Also all classes k ¸ i and l
such that j ¸ l have women matching exclusively with men in either set M1
or set M2, but not both.
Claim 4: Let i 2 f0;::::;n1g and j 2 f0;::::;n2g be the smallest integers
such that !2(j + 1) ¸ !1(i + 1): Then we obtain the partitions as follows:










































































where bk1 is the smallest integer bk1 2 fj + 1;::::;n2g such that ¹1(k1) ¸
¹2(bk1):
!


























In equilibrium, women with x1
w 2 [!1(i + 1);!2(i + 1)] which I call
the i + 1st M1 class and the j + 1st M2 class, will match only with men
in set M1 with xm 2 [¹1(i + 1);¹1(i)) and men in set M2 with xm 2
[¹2(j + 1);¹2(j)). The men in the i+ 1st M1 class however match with all
women in the i + 1st M1 class, and all women in the j + 1st to n2 M2 class,
that is women with x1
w 2 [!1(i + 1);!1(i)); and men in the j+1st M2 class
match with all women in the i + 1st to n1th M1 class, and all women in the
j + 1st M2 class, that is women with x1
w 2 [!2(j);!2(j + 1)):
For all k1 > i + 1 women in the type k1st M1 class (those with x1
w 2
[!1(k1);!1(k1 ¡ 1)) match with men of type M1 belonging to the k1st class,
that is men with xm 2 [¹1(k1);¹1 (k1 ¡1))and with men in set M2 belonging
to classes j to k1; that is men with xm 2 [¹1(k1);¹2(j)) and vice versa.
23For all k2 > j + 1 women in the type k2nd M2 class (those with x1
w 2
[!2(k2 ¡ 1);!2(k2)) match with men of type M2 belonging to the k2nd class,
that is men with xm 2 [¹2(k2);¹2 (k2 ¡1))and with men in set M1 belonging
to classes i to k2; that is men with xm 2 [¹2(k2);¹1(i))
Proof of Claim 4: See Appendix.
n1 and n2 are set in such a way that either no man stays single forever
in equilibrium, or no woman stays single forever in equilibrium or both.
Then equations 10 to 17 characterize the four partitions !1; !2; ¹1 and ¹2
completing the proof of Proposition 1.¥
² The reservation strategy of women is decreasing for x1
w 2 [0;!2(j)], is
increasingforx1
w 2 (!2(j);!2(j + 1)], isdecreasingforx1
w 2 (!2(j + 1);!1(i)),
and is increasing for x1
w 2 [!1(i);1]:
² There may be either men or women who stay single forever in steady
state equilibrium, but not both.
² Straightforward inspection shows that there are a positive measure of
men in all classes and women in all classes.
4 Preferences over two Traits.
In this section I consider the case when the men in set M1 care only about
how tall the woman they match with is, since their instantaneous utility from
matching with w is 1 + x1
w; while the men in set M2 care only about how
wealthy the woman they match with is, since their instantaneous utility from
matching with w is 1+x2
w: We can write out the reservation values of women,



































24where Gm (:nw) is the distribution of wealth among men who propose to
w; G1
w (:nm) isthe marginal distribution of height among women who propose
to m and G2



























































u1 < u2 < u3
In this section I restrict attention to the case when µ =
1
2; although the
generalization to other values of µ is not di¢cult. The indi¤erence curves of
men in sets M1 and M2 are shown in …gure 5.
A stationary steady state equilibrium is de…ned as follows: given Gm (:);
G1
w (:) and G2
w (:); each individual agent chooses that stationary strategy that
maximizes his/her utility, taking as given the strategies used by all others.
In equilibrium, there exists a partition on [0;1] that delineate men into
classes along the wealth dimension. There exist two other partitions on [0;1],
one of which divides women into di¤erent segments along the height dimen-
sion, and the other divides them into segments along the wealth dimension..
25Let ¹ = [¹(n);:::::;¹(0)] with ¹(0) = 1; be the partition on men’s wealth:
The elements of these partitions correspond to the reservation wealth levels
of women in equilibrium.
All men with xm 2 [¹(k);¹(k ¡1)) belong to the kth class of men,
for all k > 1: Men with xm 2 [¹(1);¹(0)] belong to the 1st class among
men. All men of type M1 belonging to class k have the same reservation
height level, which we denote as !1(k); and all men of type M2 belonging
to class k have the same reservation wealth level, which we denote as !2(k):
!1 = [!1(n1);:::;!1(0)]; with !1(0) = 1 forms the partition of women on
the height dimension and !2 = [!2(n1);:::;!2(0)] forms the partition of
women on the wealth dimension.
In a steady state equilibrium the reservation values of men in both M1
and M2 is nondecreasing in their wealth. So we have !1(0) ¸ ::: ¸ !1(n1);
and !2(0) ¸ ::: ¸ !2(n1): What about the reservation values of women?











: Moreover, holding x2
w constant, the
reservation value of women is increasing in x1
w and holding x1
w constant, their
reservation value is increasing in x1
w. However, we cannot say which of the




w2 has a higher expected





w2 + " for some small "; and let x2
w1 = x2
w2 + M; for some
large M. That is w2 is slightly shorter than w1; but much wealthier. In
equilibrium and in the presence of frictions, however, w1 may get a higher
expected payo¤ than w2:
As in the perfectly negatively correlated case, in the presence of frictions,
women like w1 with mediocre values for both traits do better than other
women like w2 who have a much higher value in one trait, but a slightly
lower one in the other. This is in sharp contrast to what happens as frictions
disappear. As frictions decrease however, women along the diagonal (having
the same values for both traits) do much worse that women at the north-west
and south-east corners, that is women with (1;") for " > 0; small or with
(";1): Figures 5A-D serve as visual aids in understanding what assignments
look like in this case, and the e¤ect of a reduction in frictions. Figure 5A-B
represents equilibrium partitions when there are a lot of frictions (small ®
r):
Figure 5A is to be interpreted as follows. There are four classes of men
(as you see in Figure 5B, below). The vertical line to the right represents
the reservation value of the men of type M1 in class 1, and the vertical line













M1 men in classes3 and 4 have areservation value below0: Thehorizontal
lines represent the reservation values of men of type M2 in class 1 and class
2; with the line towards the top being that of class 1: Once again, the
reservation values of M2 men in classes 3 and 4 is below 0: The reservation
values of the men divide the women into classes. Each box in …gure 5A
represents a class of women, and all women in these classes have the same
reservation value (the minimum level of wealth of the man that she will match
with)10. The numbers within the boxes represents the classes of men with
whom these woman may match in equilibrium. For instance, the box in the
10The reason why the boxes in 5A are symmetric around the 45 degree line is because
µ = 1
2: For other values of µ that would not be the case.
27top right corner has (1;1) written in it. So in equilibrium, women in this
box will match only with men of type M2 in class 1, and with men of type
M1 in class 2. The box to its left has (1 ¡ 2;2) which says that women in
that box match only with men of type M2 in classes 1 and 2, and men of
type M1 in class 1: Notice that the wealth of women in this box is greater
than the reservation value of men of type M2 in class 1; but their height is
lower than the reservation value of men of type M1 in class 1: So when a
box has (in2 ¡ in1;jl2 ¡ jl1) written in it, then in equilibrium, women in that
box match with men of type M2 in classes in2 to in1 and with men of type













The vertical lines in …gure 5B indicate the reservation values of di¤erent
28classes of women. Now let us look at what the equilibrium looks like when
















































Figure 5C describes equilibrium for an environment when frictions are
a lot smaller than the previous environment. You can see that the same
patterns reveal themselves as before, except that there are a lot more classes.
This is because the reservation values of men went up (with frictions going
down), as did the reservation values of women. The new notation M2 1-3 in
one of the boxes simply implies that the women in the box match only with
men of type M2 who are in classes 1, 2 and 3:
As frictions goes up one can see, similar to the case when men had di-
ametrically opposite preferences that women with high values in one trait
(whatever the value of the other trait) begin doing better than women of
29medium height and wealth. There still continues to be some advantage to
being moderately appealing to both groups of men. As frictions go down to
zero however, appealing to diverse tastes brings no return.
Another similarity to the case with diametrically opposed preferences is
that there are classes of wealthy women who match exclusively with men in
set M2; and tall women who match exclusively with men in set M1: These
classes arise endogenously, women do not care whether the men they match
with are in set M1 or in set M2; they only care about his wealth.
I provide an algorithm for obtaining the steady state of this game in
the appendix. I characterize the core of the static game when women vary
along two traits and di¤erent groups of men value di¤erent traits in the next
section.
5 The Core of the Assignment Game.
In this section I will de…ne the core of the assignment game, when women dif-
fer from each other along two dimensions. I make the following assumptions
in this section
² Wealth of men is distributed uniformly over [0;1]:
² The marginal distribution of height in women is uniform over [0;1]:
² The marginal distribution of wealth in women is uniform over [0;1]:





We need some additional notation as well.
De…ne ¹m 2 ¢(M); ¹m = ¸
2 (where ¸
2 is the Lebesgue measure on
[0;1]£(0;1]), the population measure on the Borel sigma algebra of M, and
¹w 2 ¢(W); ¹w = ¸
2, the population measure on the Borel sigma algebra of
W. By the de…nition of ¹m the measure of all men in set M1 with a ¸ xm
for any a 2 [0;1], is ¹m (m : m 2 S;a ¸ xm) = a
2.
Denote the disjoint union of individuals as W [ M. We de…ne the com-
bined population measure on W [ M as ¹. By de…nition ¹(E [ F) =
¹w (E) + ¹m (F); for all E µ W and F µ M. We would like to assign
30women to men in such a way that (1) No man or woman prefers to remain
single to being matched (2) There does not exist any pair, one man and one
woman such that they would prefer to be matched with each other over their
current matches.
5.1 Feasible Assignment
A feasible assignment is de…ned as follows:
¼ : W [ M ! W [ M, ¼ is a measure preserving isomorphism from
W [ M onto itself of order two (that is, ¼2(x) = x) such that if ¼(w) 6= w
then ¼ (w) 2 M, and if ¼ (m) 6= m then ¼(m) 2 W). By de…nition we
have (i) ¼ being one-to-one, onto, and measurable in both directions and
(ii) ¹(C) = ¹(¼ (C)) for all C µ W [ M. If ¼ (x) = x then the person x
remains single and is not matched with anyone under allocation ¼. The set
of all such maps will be denoted by ¦. This is also the set of all feasible
allocations.
5.2 Payo¤
The utility of men and women fromamatching¼ isde…nedby u : (¦£ W [ M) !
[0;1] as follows:
u(¼;m) = xi
¼(m) if ¼ (m) 2 W (where i = 1 if m 2 M1 and i = 2 if
m 2 M2),
u(¼;m) = 0 if ¼ (m) = m (The utility of staying single is 0),
u(¼;w) = x¼(w) if ¼ (w) 2 M and u(¼;w) = 0 if ¼(w) = w:
5.3 The Core
A feasible allocation belongs to the core if it satis…es the condition that
(1) there does not exist any m or any w such that 0 > u(¼;m) or 0 >
u(¼;w) and
(2) there does not exist any pair (w;m) such that xm > u(¼;w) and
xi
w > u(¼;m).
31That is, no single person blocks the core allocation, nor is it blocked by
any pair of agents.11
To help characterize the core of the assignment game, I will …rst de…ne a
few objects.
Given any feasible allocation ¼ :
² De…ne 'w : ¦ £ M ! f0;1g for every w 2 W as
'w (¼;m) =
½
1 if xm > u(¼;w);
0 otherwise. :
The set fm : 'w (¼;m) = 1g then represents the men that the woman w
would prefer to be matched with to her partner under ¼.






The set fw : 'm (¼;w) = 1g then represents the women that man m would
prefer to be matched with to his partner under ¼.
² De…ne
z¼ = fw : 9m 2 M with 'w (¼;m) = 1 and 'm (¼;w) = 1:g
Claim 5: A feasible allocation ¼ is in the core if and only if z¼ = ©.
11I use the concept of the f-core in this de…nition. Although there are a continuum of
both men and women, each point in the continuum represents an individual player and
…nite coalitions can block allocations. In this sense, in my model the continuum of men
and women are simply approximations of very large …nite sets of men and women. Since
the individual is a non-negligible coalition member in …nite sets, however large, the f-core
works on the assumption that the individual is a non-negligible member of coalitions in
the continuum as well.
32Proof of Claim 5: If z¼ 6= © then there exists a woman w 2 W and a
man m 2 M with 'w (¼;m) = 1 and 'm (¼;w) = 1: fw;mg form a blocking
coalition since each of them strictly prefers to be matched to the other, rather
than to their partners under ¼:
If ¼ belongs to the core, then ¼ is not blocked by any single individual,
or by any pair of agents. In particular, @fw;mg, w 2 W, m 2 M with
'w (¼;m) = 1 and 'm (¼;w) = 1: Therefore z¼ = ©:¥
5.4 Proposition 2
The allocation ¼1 de…ned as:






































































¼1(m : (0;i)) = m for all i 2 (0;1]
is in the core12
Figure 6 gives a pictorial representation of what the core allocation looks
like.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Step 1: Allocation ¼1 is feasible.
Inspection of Proposition 2 shows us that ¼1 : W [ M ! W [ M, is of
order two and ¹(C) = ¹(¼ (C)) for all C µ W [ M.
Step 2: z¼1 = ©:























w; which makes 'm (¼1;w) = 0:
So every man in the set fm : 'w (¼;m) = 1g strictly prefers his partner under
12The core maps any woman with x2
w ￿ x1
w = a for some a 2 [0;1] to the man with
wealth a2 in set M1; and any woman with x1
w < x2
w = a to the man with wealth a2 in set
M2:
33¼1 to w; and w = 2 z¼1: Since this is true for every woman z¼1 = ©; and





























In the appendix I provide a sequence of games with …nite numbers of
players, the set of women converging to W; the set of men converging to M;
and a sequence of allocations that belong in the core of each …nite game in
the sequence, that converges (in measure) to ¼1:
5.5 Proposition 3
In any core allocation, the payo¤ to man m is
p









Proof of Proposition 3: See appendix.
In any core allocation,
² All women whose height is greater than their level of wealth (x1
w ¸ x2
w)
match with men in set M1; all women whose level of wealth is greater
than their height (x2
w > x1
w) match with men in set M2;




man receives a payo¤
p
xm:
34What is the e¤ect of having heterogenous preferences on the payo¤s of
agents in the market?
If all men belonged toset M1; (when only one trait of awoman isrelevant),
then the payo¤ to the men in any core allocation would be xm; and the payo¤
to the women would be x1
w
13: Every man does better in the heterogenous
preferences case. Among women, all those who have x1
w ¸ x2
w do worse,
since there are fewer men who prefer tall women, and all those with x1
w < x2
w
do better, since now there are some men who value the trait in which these
women have a comparative advantage.
The other important di¤erence between the core of this game and the
dynamic equilibriumde…ned in the previous section isthat in the core, women
along the diagonal (those with x1
w = x2











w: So in the case of the two women w1 and w2
(that we discussed in Section 4) with w1 on the diagonal and x1
w1 = x1
w2 + "
for some small "; and x2
w1 = x2















¢¢2. It is very
likely that x2
w1 + M > x1
w1 and so w2 does a lot better than w1 in this case,
the exact opposite of the relative performance of these two women in the
dynamic equilibrium with frictions.
6 Conclusion
One of the main di¤erences is that in the presence of frictions, an individual
who is moderately appealing to diverse tastes among the opposite sex may
make a better match than someone who is found to be stunning by one group,
but leaves the others cold. A second di¤erence is that the perfect assortion
prediction by Becker (1973) does not arise. Instead one sees assortative
patterns along more than one dimension. This seems more in tune with
empirical evidence of correlation between traits being around 60% along more
than one dimension.
In this paper I attempt to analyze the equilibrium that arises in the
13If all men belonged to set M1; each man would match with the woman whose intel-
ligence is exactly the same as his level of wealth, and each woman would match with the
man whose wealth is exactly the same as her level of intelligence. This can be estab-
lished trivially. In the core of such a game (when only one trait is valued) the payo¤ to
each woman has to be nondecreasing in her intelligence (else a blocking coalition can be
formed). This leads to the assignment outlined above.
35marriage market when one side of the market has heterogenous preferences.
When women vary from one another along one trait only (as in Becker
(1973)), but when men have diametrically opposed preferences for that one
trait, then in the presence of search frictions, women with mediocrity in both
traits do better than women that excel in one. This continues to be true in
the case when women di¤er along more than one trait (I do the analysis with
2 traits), and some men care only about one of the traits and the others care
only about the other trait. Some women who are mediocre in both traits do
better than other women who are a lot better in one of the characteristics,
and just slightly less good in the other trait. Which women would prefer
to trade places with which other women depends entirely upon the extent of
frictions and the speci…c parameters of the matching technology.
The …ndings in this paper extend to the case when men are divided into
two sets, with one set getting instantaneous utility ¿x1
w + (1 ¡ ¿)x2
w upon
matching with w; and the other set getting instantaneous utility (1 ¡ ¿)x1
w+
¿x2
w upon matching with w; for some ¿ 2 [0;1]: That is, one set of men care
more about trait 1, while the second cares more about trait 2. Once again in
the presence of frictions women who are mediocre do better than those that
excel in one and are less than mediocre in the other. However, as frictions
become smaller and smaller, mediocrity loses its attraction to women, and
…nally, mediocre women (those along the diagonal) do the worst when there
are no frictions at all.
It is possible to extend this research in many directions. The …rst obvious
direction is: what do the patterns of matching predict if agents on both sides
of the market di¤er in more than one trait? The second is to question
what would happen if the preferences of men di¤ered continuously, instead
of discreetly as assumed in this paper. A third direction is to consider
this set-up with transferable utility. The results of such a model would be
more easily applicable to the labor market. It would also be interesting
to consider di¤erent institutions, for instance, suppose agents could direct
search by forming discos or book clubs, would all agents bene…t from such
segregation? Would agents willingly join such clubs, and if not, would the
clubs vanish, or would they continue with some agents in them and some
not?
Another direction in which this research could head is whether the results
obtained in the static two-sided matching literature, with no search, can
be extended to the dynamic two-sided matching literature with search and
without the cloning assumption.
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387 Appendix
7.1 Proofs from Section 3
Claim 1:
Assumptions: If n1 6= 1; and if !1(1) > !2(1); let w1 be a woman with
height !1(1) and let w2 be a woman with height !2(1): Denote R! (w1) as
¹1(1) and R! (w2) as ¹2(1); and if ¹1(1) ¸ ¹2(1) then
Statement of Claim 1: In equilibrium, men in set M1 with xm 2
[¹1(1);1] marry only women with x1
w 2 [!1(1);1]; and vice versa. This set
of men and women form an exclusive class and match only with members of
the opposite sex from the same class.








(1 ¡ x)dx ¡ 1
Proof of Claim 1:
Step 1: All women taller than w1 have reservation values lower than





0 such that x1
w
0 2 [!1(1);1]:
All men in set M1 propose to both w
0 and w1; and any man in set
M2 who proposes to w






Step 2: All the men in set M1 with xm 2 [¹1(1);1] have the same







0 2 [¹1(1);1] £ (0;a]:
Take any m
0 2 [¹1(1);1] £ (0;a]: All women with x1
w
0 2 [!1(1);1]
propose to him (since their reservation value is smaller than ¹1(1)): Let’s
suppose that no other woman would propose to m

















































¸ R; since the reservation values of men is
increasing in their level of wealth by claim 1. The …rst term in the above
equation is therefore positive. But given that !1(1) ¸ R; the …rst term






Step 3: All women shorter than w2 have reservation values lower than





0 such that x2
w
0 2 [0;!2(1)]:
All men in set M2 propose to both w
0 and w2; and any man in set
M1 who proposes to w






Step 4: All the men in set M2 with xm 2 [¹2(1);1] have the same







0 2 [¹2(1);1] £ (a;1]:
Take any m
0 2 [¹1(1);1] £ (a;1]: All women with x1
w
0 2 [0;!2(1)]
propose to him (since their reservation value is smaller than ¹2(1)): Let’s
suppose that no other woman would propose to m
0: Similar to what we did







; and after substitution from 8;

















Step 5: The woman w1 (with height x1
w = !1(1)) matches only with
men in set M1 in equilibrium.
We know that R! (w1) = ¹1(1); by de…nition. No man in set M2
with wealth xm ¸ ¹1(1) ever proposes to w1 (since he doesn’t propose to
anyone taller than !2(1)): Since she does not accept any proposals from
men with wealth ¹1(1) ¸ xm; she matches in equilibrium only with men in
set M1¨
Notice that w1 does not reject men in M2 with xm ¸ !1(1): It is they
who do not accept her proposal.








(1 ¡ x)dx ¡ 1
Step 6: All women taller than w1 also have a reservation value ¹1(1)
and match only with men in set M1 in equilibrium.
Take any woman w
0 taller than w1: All the men in M1 propose






























This establishes that in equilibrium, men in set M1 with xm 2 [¹1(1);1]
marry only women with x1
w 2 [!1(1);1]; and vice versa.¥
Claim 2:
Assumptions: m3 2 M1; with xm such that ¹2(1) < xm < ¹1(1):
!1(2) is the reservation utility of m3, and !1(2) > !2(1): w3 is a woman
with height !1(2);and her reservation utility is ¹1(2); we have ¹2(1) >
¹1(2):
Statement of Claim 2: In equilibrium, men in set M2 with xm 2
[¹2(1);1] marry only women with x1
w 2 [0;!2(1)]; and vice versa. This set
of men and women form another exclusive class whose members match only
with each other.








(1 ¡ x)dx ¡ 1
Proof of Claim 2:
Step 1: The woman w2 (with height x1
w = !2(1)) matches only with
men in set M2 in equilibrium.
We know that R! (w2) = ¹2(1); by de…nition. No man in set M1
with wealth xm ¸ ¹2(1) ever proposes to w2 (since he doesn’t propose to
anyone shorter than !1(2)): Since w2 does not accept any proposals from
41men with wealth ¹2(1) ¸ xm; she matches in equilibrium only with men in
set M2
Notice that w2 has no preferences over whether the man belongs to M1 or
M2, provided that he is rich enough. But a wealthy man who prefers short
women …nd her too tall to propose to.








(1 ¡ x)dx ¡ 1
Step 2: All women shorter than w2 also have a reservation value ¹2(1)
and match only with men in set M2 in equilibrium.
Take any woman w
0 shorter than w1: All the men in M2 propose






























This establishes that in equilibrium, men in set M2 with xm 2 [¹2(1);1]
marry only women with x1
w 2 [0;!1(1)]; and vice versa.¥
Claim 3: Let i 2 f0;::::;n1g and j 2 f0;::::;n2g be the smallest integers
such that !2(j + 1) ¸ !1(i + 1): Then we obtain the partitions as follows:






















2(k2 ¡ 1) ¡x
¢
dx ¡ 1























In equilibrium, for all k such that i ¸ k men in set M1 with xm 2
[¹1(k);¹1(k ¡ 1)] marry only women with x1
w 2 [!1(k);!1(k ¡ 1)]; and vice
versa, and forall j such thatj ¸ k; menin set M2 with xm 2 [¹2(k);¹2(k ¡ 1)]
marry only women with x1
w 2 [!2(k);!2(k ¡ 1)]; and vice versa.
Proof of Claim 3: We will prove this claim by induction. Let claim 3 be
true for all k1 < l1 for some l1 with i ¸ l1; and for all k2 < l2 for some l2 with
j ¸ l2: By assumption we have !1(k1) > !2(k2): Let w1 be a woman with
height !1(k1) and let w2 be a woman with height !2(k2): Denote R! (w1) as
¹1(k1) and R! (w2) as ¹2(k2): Either ¹1(k1) < ¹2(k2) or ¹1(k1) ¸ ¹2(k2).
If ¹1(k1) < ¹2(k2); then
Step 1: R! (w) < ¹2(k2) for all women w with x1
w 2 (!2(k2);!1(k1)):
Suppose not: let 9w
0 be a woman with x1





¹2(k2): Such a woman would never marry, since no man in set M1 with
xm 2 [¹1(k1);1] ever proposes to her (since all M1 men in classes k1 and
above only marry M1 women in their own classes) , and no man in set M2
with xm 2 [¹2(k2);1] ever proposes to her. It is therefore strictly better o¤





Step 2: Take the man m
0 in set M2 with xm = ¹2(k2) ¡ " > ¹1(k1):
Such a man receives proposals from all women with x1
w 2 (!2(k2);!1(x));
where k1 ¸ x is such that ¹1(x) ¸ ¹2(k2) (there exists such an x; since
¹1(0) = 1 ¸ ¹2(k2)): What is his strategy? We know that !1(x) ¸
!1(k1) ¸ !1(i) ¸ !2(k2 + 1). Therefore,
!














and simplifying we have
43!










Step 3: If ¹1(k1) ¸ ¹2(k2); then we could retrace the steps 1 and 2 to
get
!










Step 4: If k1 < i; and k2 < j; then by assumption we have !1(k1 + 1) >
!2(k2 + 1): Let w3 be a woman with height !1(k1 + 1) and let w4 be a
woman with height !2(k2 + 1): Denote R! (w3) as ¹1(k1 + 1) and R! (w4)
as ¹2(k2 + 1): Either ¹1(k1 + 1) < ¹2(k2 + 1) or ¹1(k1 + 1) ¸ ¹2(k2 + 1).
If ¹1(k1 + 1) < ¹2(k2 + 1); then
No man in set M1 with wealth xm ¸ ¹2(k2 + 1) ever proposes to w4 (since
he doesn’t propose to anyone shorter than !1(k1 + 1)): Since w4 does not
accept any proposals from men with wealth xm < ¹2(k2 + 1) (that being her
reservation value) she matches in equilibrium only with men in set M2
We can now characterize ¹2(k2 + 1) as
¹











Step 5: If ¹1(k1 + 1) ¸ ¹2(k2 + 1); then no man in set M2 with wealth
xm ¸ ¹1(k1 + 1) ever proposes to w3; and since she does not accept any
proposals frommen with wealth xm < ¹1(k1 + 1); she matches in equilibrium
only with men in set M1
We can now characterize ¹1(k1 + 1) as
¹











Steps 1, 2 and 3 prove that equations 12 and 13 characterize !1(k1) and
!2(k2) for all k1 such that i+1 ¸ k1 and k2 such that j +1 ¸ k2: However,
44at the beginning of Step 4 we assumed that k1 < 1; and proved the statement
for k1+1: Therefore equations 10 and 11 characterize ¹1(k1) and ¹2(k2) for
all k1 such that i ¸ k1 and k2 such that j ¸ k2:
That completes the proof of claim 3.¥
Claim 4: Let i 2 f0;::::;n1g and j 2 f0;::::;n2g be the smallest integers
such that !2(j + 1) ¸ !1(i + 1): Then we obtain the partitions as follows:










































































where bk1 is the smallest integer bk1 2 fj + 1;::::;n2g such that ¹1(k1) ¸
¹2(bk1):
!


























45Proof of Claim 4:
Step 1: Any woman w
0 with x1
w
0 2 [!1(i + 1);!2(j + 1)] doesnot receive
proposals from any M1 man in the …rst i classes, that is any man with
xm 2 [¹1(i);1]; and from any M2 man in the …rst j classes, that is any man
with xm 2 [¹2(j);1]. She receives proposals from all other men, and so her
reservation value is given by
¹





















This class forms the i + 1st M1 class as well as the j + 1st M2 class as
so we have ¹1(i + 1) = ¹2(j + 1): In equilibrium, women in the i + 1st M1
class and the j + 1st M2 class, match only with men in the i + 1st M1 class
and men in the j+1th M2 class. Men in the i+1st M1 class however match
with women in the i + 1st M1 class and to women in the j + 1st to n2th M2
class. Similarly men in the j+1st M2 class match with women in the j+1st
M2 class and to women in the i + 1st to n1th M1 class
Step 2: For all k > i + 1 any woman w
0 with x1
w
0 2 [!1(k);!1(k ¡ 1));
gets proposals from all men in the kth M1 class, and men in the kth to j+1st























and for all k > j + 1 any woman w
0 with x1
w
0 2 (!2(k ¡ 1);!2(k)]; get
proposals from all men in the kth M2 class, and men in the kth to i + 1st























Step 3: For all k > i+1, any m such that xm 2 [¹1(k);¹1(k ¡ 1)); gets
proposals from all women with x1
w 2 [!1(k);!1(k ¡ 1)) and women with
x1
w (!2(bk);!1(i)] where bk is the smallest integer bk 2 fj + 1;::::;n2g such





























similarly for all k > j + 1 we get
!


























where bk is the smallest integerbk 2 fi + 1;::::;n1g such that ¹2(k) ¸ ¹1(bk):
That completes the proof of claim 4¥.
7.2 Section 4
Characterizing steady state equilibrium in the environment when women
di¤er continuously along two traits, height and wealth, and when men have
heterogenous preferences, with one group preferring tall women, and the
other preferring wealthy women:
Given (Gm;G1
w;G2
w), a steady state equilibrium exists and is unique. It
is characterized by three partitions, ¹;!1;!2 on [0;1]; with ¹ partitioning
47men on the basis of their wealth, !1 partitioning women on the basis of their
height and !2 partitioning women on the basis of their wealth.
These partitions can be determined as follows: Set !1(0) = !2(0) =
¹(0) = 1: Begin by computing the reservation value of the woman (1;1)
who gets proposals from all men, and term this reservation value ¹(1): All
men with xm ¸ ¹(1) belong to the …rst class of men.
Next take aman in set M1 who belongs in the …rst class: He getsproposals
from all women and we will compute and denote his reservation value as
!1(1): This is also the reservation values of all M1 men in class 1. Do the
same for a man in set M2 who belongs to class 1, and denote his reservation
value as !2(1): The reservation values of all M2 men in class 1 is !2(1):
Now all women with x1
w ¸ !1(1) and x2
w ¸ !2(1) form the …rst class of
women.
Now take a woman who assumes she gets proposals from all M1 men, and
all M2 men who are not in class 1. Compute her reservation value and term
it a(1). Term the reservation value of the woman who assumes she gets
proposals from all M2 men, and all M1 men who are not in class 1. Term
this b(1):
If a(1) ¸ b(1); then ¹(2) = a(1): Men in [¹(2);¹(1)) form the second
class of men and the reservation values of men of type M1 in this class
is !1(2), and those of men M2 in this class is !2(2): All women with
x1
w ¸ !1(1) and !2(1) > x2
w ¸ !2(2); have reservation value ¹(2) (If
a(1) = b(1); then women with x2
w ¸ !2(1) and !1(1) > x1
w ¸ !1(2); also
have reservation value ¹(2)):
Now take the woman who assumes she gets proposals from all M1 men,
and all M2 men who are not in classes 1 and 2, and let her reservation value
be a(2): If a(2) ¸ b(1); then ¹(3) = a(2) and men in [¹(3);¹(2)) form
the thrid class of men. Let !1(3) be the reservation value of M1 men in
class 3 and !2(3) be the reservation value of M2 men in class 3. Then all
women with x1
w ¸ !1(1); and !2(2) > x2
w ¸ !2(3) have reservation value
¹(3):
One continues in this manner until we get the equilibrium partition.
A word of explanation on what produces the classes when very wealthy
woman match only with men in set M2 (or when very tall women match
only with men in set M1): Let some woman be such that x2
w ¸ !2(1) and
x2
w < !1(3): So this woman gets proposals from all men in set M1; but does
not get proposals from M1 men in classes 1; 2 and 3. She computes her
reservation value assuming that men in M1 below class 3 propose to her, and
48denote it b(3): If b(3) ¸ ¹(3); then this woman accepts no proposals from
any man in set M1 (since the only M1s who propose to her have xm < ¹(3));
and so in equilibrium she matches only with men in set M2:
7.3 Proofs from Section 5
7.3.1 Proposition 3
In any core allocation, the payo¤ to man m is
p









Proof of Proposition 3:
Step 1: Let T = fw : ¼(w) 2 M1g; be the set of all women matched
with men in set M1: Similarly let S = fw : ¼ (w) 2 M2g; be the set of women
matched with men in set M2:
Claim 6: If ¼ is a core allocation. The utility of women u(¼;w) is
nondecreasing in x1
w over the set T, and the utility of men u(¼;m) is non-
decreasing in xm over M1: Also the utility of women is nondecreasing in x2
w
over the set S.and that of men is nondecreasing in xm over M2:
Proof of Claim 6: Suppose u(¼;m) is not weakly increasing in xm over
the set M1: Then 9m;m
0 s.t. m;m
0 2 M1, xm > xm









form a coalition that blocks ¼: Now















coalition that blocks ¼: Similarly we can prove that the utility of women is
nondecreasing in x2
w over the set S.and that of men is nondecreasing in xm
over M2:¥
Step 2: Let W c
1 = fw : x1
w ¸ c;x1
w ¸ x2
wg; for some c 2 [0;1] and let
W c




1 = fw : x1
w ¸ x2




w ¸ cg (Figures 6A and B indicate these sets). It is obvious
that Ec
1 ½ W c
1 and Ec











; be all the man in set M1 with wealth
strictly greater than c; and Mc
2 =
©





; be all the men in

































Claim 7: If ¼ is a core allocation, then it must be true that u(¼;w) ¸ c2
for all women w 2 Ec
1 [ Ec
2; for all c 2 (0;1):
Proof of Claim 7: Suppose not, then 9w1 2 Ec
1 [ Ec
2 st u(¼;w1) < c2:
Let the wealth of her partner under ¼ be x¼(w1) = c2 ¡ " for some " > 0:
All men m1 2 M1 with xm1 > c2 ¡ " must have u(¼;m) ¸ x1
w ¸ c; else









m2 2 M2 with xm > c2 ¡" must have u(¼;m) ¸ x2
w ¸ c; else fw1;m2g form



























= ¹w (W c
1 [ Ec
2 [ W c
2 [ Ec
1) = 1 ¡ c2:




















This claim establishes that u(¼;w) ¸ (min(x1
w;x2
w))
2 for all w 2 W:
Claim 8: If ¼ is a core allocation, then it must be true that u(¼;w) ¸ c2
for all women w 2 Wc
1 [ W c
2 for all c 2 (0;1):
Proof of Claim 8: Suppose not, then 9w1 2 W c
1 [ W c
2 st u(¼;w1) < c2:
Let w1 2 W c
1 and let the wealth of her partner under ¼ be x¼(w1) = c2¡" for
some " > 0: All men m1 2 M1 with xm1 > c2¡" must have u(¼;m) ¸ x1
w1 =


















2 ; therefore it must be true
50that the set of men m 2 M
c2¡"
1 with ¼ (m) 2 Ec
2 is a set of positive measure.
That is M
c2¡"
1 \ ¼ (Ec
2) has measure ¸
"
2 > 0: Given claim 6, we know that







w: Therefore there exists a set of
women w 2 Ec
1 [ Ec
2 with u(¼;w) < c2: This constitutes a contradiction of
Claim 7.¥
This establishes that u(¼;w) = (max(x1
w;x2
w))
2: It is now trivial to see
that T = fw : x1
w ¸ x2
wg and S = fw : x1
w < x2
wg. That is, the set of women
with x1
w ¸ x2
w is exactly the same as the set of women matched to men in
set M1; and the set of women with x2
w > x1
w is exactly the same as the set of
women matched to men in set M2:That ends the proof of proposition 3.¥
7.3.2 Proposition 4
The exists a sequence of games with …nite numbers of players, with the set of
women converging to W; the set of men converging to M; and a sequence of
allocations that belong in the core of each …nite game in the sequence, that
converges (in measure) to ¼1:
Proof of Proposition 4: I will prove this proposition by construction.
Let N = 2n for n = 1;2;:::: For each N; there are a …nite number of men
and women Mn = Wn = (N +1)N: Any man m is characterized by his level
of wealth and his preference over the traits of women, (xm;i). The level of
wealth of any man could be xm = 0; 1
N; 2
N;:::; N¡1













; then the man belongs to set M1; he
derives utility from the height of the woman he mates with, and is indi¤erent





; then he belongs to set M2; he derives
utility from the level of wealth of the woman and is indi¤erent to her height.
A woman’s height could be one of x1
w = 0; 1
N; 2
N;:::; N¡1
N ;1; and her level of







N ;1: We can see that as n ! 1;
Mn ! M; and Wn ! W:






N ;1: In each of these …nite games we use
the following algorithm to de…ne one element in the core of that …nite game.
These core elements converge to ¼1 as n ! 1:
Algorithm: By the algorithm all men of type M1 are assigned to women
with x1
w ¸ x2
w: All men of type M2 are assigned to women with x2
w > x1
w:
The precise de…nition of the algorithm that results in a one-to-one and onto
assignment of assignment of men to women would require a lot of notation.
I describe it roughly here.
51² Assign any man in set M1 with (s;i) to a woman as follows:
(1) Her height x1
w =
j+k
N ; where j is given by
N
2s ¸ j
2 + j (18)
and j
2 + 3j + 2 ¸ N
2s (19)









2 + K (20)
and K








It can be shown that
p
N ¸ k: Therefore s determines her height.
(2) The level of wealth x2
w of the woman that the man is assigned to is





N; where l could be di¤erent for each man, and
p
N ¸ l: l is decided on by taking care that each woman is assigned to only
one man. Therefore i determines the woman’s wealth level.




where j is given by 18 and 19, and j by 20 and 21.
Notice that s determines wealth of the woman.










where l could be di¤erent for each man, and
p
N ¸ l; once again making
sure that each woman is assigned to one man only.
Claim A1:
The assignment described by the above algorithm belongs in the core of
each …nite game.
Proof of Claim A1:




N ; j and k de…ned as above. For any given s; the number of men
with xm < s; and belonging to set M1 is
N2s









w in the core (else a blocking pair can be formed). Therefore the






which gives us 18. The fact that j should be the smallest integer such
that this is true gives us 19. At the same time j+k should also be such that
m with xm = s in set M1 is not assigned a woman with greater intelligence
than any woman assigned to men with xm > s: This gives us conditions for
k. Since the men are indi¤erent to wealth, the level of wealth of the woman
they are assigned to is immaterial in determining if the allocation is in the
core. The above argument can be repeated in the case when the men belong
to set M2: This completes the proof that the allocation described by the
algorithm is in the core.¥
Notice that the core allocation is by no means unique.
Claim A2: The sequence of core allocations of the …nite game converges
to ¼1:
Proof of Claim A2: Any man with wealth s in set M1 matches with a
woman of height
j+k
N ; j given in equations 18 and 19, and
p
N ¸ k Approx-
imating j
j




























4N2 + s +
k
N
As n ! 1; N ! 1; therefore x1
w !
p
s: Therefore in the limit
u(¼;m) =
p
xm for any man with xm that is rational. Similarly, u(¼;w) for





2 in the limit.
The level of wealth x2
w of the woman that the man in set M1 with pref-







N ¸ l : When




w: The height x1
w of the woman that the man in




















Notice that all the men with xm = 0 match with some woman in the core
of each …nite game. However, in the limit, the height of each of these women
converges to 0 as does their wealth. But (0;0) = 2 W; and so in the continuum
game, these men remain single. Therefore the convergence of the core of the
…nite games to the continuum game is only in measure.
We have shown that the core assignments in the …nite game does converge
tothe core assignment in thecontinuumgame forall men with levelsof wealth
that are rational except those with xm = 0: Since ¼1 is a continuous function
a.e, this ensures that the core assignments in the …nite game does converge to
the core assignment in the continuum game for all men with levels of wealth,
except for those with xm = 0:
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